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UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
COMMENTARY
JUDICIAL AND STATUTORY LIMITATIONS ON THE
RIGHTS OF A "HOLDER IN DUE COURSE" IN
CONSUMER TRANSACTIONS
The application of the "holder in due course"' doctrine of the
Uniform Commercial Code (hereinafter U.C.C.) to consumer trans-
actions often results in serious inequities for the small consumer. The
typical credit purchase of consumer goods entails a down payment
and the execution by the buyer of a promissory note,' evidencing his
obligation to pay the balance of the purchase price to the seller. In
addition, the buyer usually signs a security instrument such as a
chattel mortgage, bailment lease, or a conditional sales contract which
gives the payee of the note a security interest in the item sold.' The
promissory note and the security instrument are frequently assigned
by the seller to a finance company or similar institution. If the financer
acquires the instruments "for value," "in good faith," and "without
notice" of any irregularities or any claims or defenses to them, it
acquires the legal status of a "holder in due course" as defined by
Section 3-302 of the U.C.C. As such, under Section 3-305 of the Code,
it takes the instruments free from "all defenses of any party . . . with
whom the holder has not dealt."' Accordingly, as a holder in due
1 U.C.C. §§ 3-302, 3-305.
2 B. Curran, Trends in Consumer Credit Legislation 91 (1965) ; Jones, Finance
Companies as Holders in Due Course of Consumer Paper, 1958 Wash. U.L.Q. 177, 178.
See also Implement Credit Corp. v. Elsinger, 268 Wis. 143, 160, 66 N.W.2d 657, 666
(1954) (judicial notice taken of the prevalance of credit sales involving negotiable notes).
a B. Curran, supra note 2; Jones, supra note 2.
4 U.C.C. § 3-305, Rights of a Holder in Due Course, provides:
To the extent that a holder is a holder in due course, he takes the instrument
free from
(1) all claims to it on the part of any persons; and
(2) all defenses of any party to the instrument with whom the holder has not
dealt except
(a) infancy, to the extent that it is a defense to a simple contract; and
(b) such other incapacity, or duress, or illegality of the transaction, as
renders the obligation of the party a nullity; and
(c) such misrepresentation as has induced the party to sign the instrument
with neither knowledge nor reasonable opportunity to obtain knowl-
edge of its character or its essential terms; and
(d) discharge in insolvency proceedings; and
(e) any other discharge of which the holder has notice when he takes the
instrument.
Thus, the holder in due course is not insulated from the so-called "real" defenses enu-
merated in subsection 2; however, so-called "personal defenses," e.g., misrepresentation,
failure of consideration and breath of express or implied warranty, may not be raised
against a holder in due course.
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course, the financer is entitled to payment in full on the instrument
in his possession, but at the same time assumes no responsibility for
"claims or defenses" arising out of the transaction in which the obli-
gation was incurred.'
This relative insulation of the holder in due course from the
buyer's defenses can pose considerable difficulties if a consumer dis-
covers that he has been defrauded by the seller or if the merchandise
purchased proves defective and the seller refuses to rectify the prob-
lem. This difficulty is presented in its extreme form if the seller be-
comes insolvent or cannot be found. If the consumer decides not to
pay for the unsatisfactory purchase, he discovers that the finance com-
pany holding his note will insist upon payment in full despite his
justifiable complaint against the seller.' If the buyer persists in with-
holding payment, the finance company may ultimately sue and he
may discover that, because of the holder in due course doctrine, the
court is no more receptive to his difficulities with the seller than the
finance company was. The problem has increased greatly with the
large upsurge in consumer installment credit sales during the past
two decades.'
Since finance companies are in a much better position than the
average consumer to investigate and evaluate the reliability of their
seller-assignors, they are better able to protect their interests. A sys-
tem which so favors the financer over the relatively more vulnerable
consumer seems inherently harsh. The specific requirements of the
holder in due course doctrine have provided some sympathetic courts
with a basis for affording relief to consumers in particular fact situa-
tions. The inequities have also led some legislatures to limit the appli-
cability of the doctrine in consumer transactions. This comment will
survey a number of judicial decisions which have refused to recognize
assignees of consumer paper as holders in due course and will examine
5 With the exception of the "real" defenses as enumerated in U.S.C. § 3-305(2),
note 4 supra.
6
 Littlefield, Good Faith Purchase of Consumer Paper: The Failure of the Subjective
Test, 39 S. Cal. L. Rev. 48, 60 (1966) ; McEwen, Economic Issues in State Regulation of
Consumer Credit, 8 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 387, 401 (1967) (intentional abuse of the
holder in due course principle by "unscrupulous businessmen"); P. Wald, Report to the
National Conference on Law and Poverty 24 (June 1965) (victimization of the poor
through abuses of holder in due course) ; Note, Translating Sympathy for Deceived
Consumers into Effective Programs for Protection, 114 U. Pa. L. Rev. 395, 397-403 (1966)
(extended hypothetical dealing with holder in due course in a consumer transaction).
7 As of December 31, 1950, the total amount of consumer installment credit out-
standing was $14,703,000,000. 1967 Statistical Abstract of the United States 465, Chart
649. As of September 1969, this total had risen to $95,356,000,000. 55 Fed. Reserve
Bull. A-54 (Nov. 1969). See generally J. Chapman and R. Shay, The Consumer Finance
Industry, Its Costs and Regulation 2 (1967) ; B. Curran, supra note 2, 1-2 (1965) ; Jones,
supra note 2; Introduction—Consumer Credit Symposium, 55 Nw. U.L. Rev. 301 (1960).
The burgeoning demand by consumers for installment credit has been attributed
largely to "the growth in population, earlier family formation, rising incomes, and the in-
creasing availability of sources for consumer credit." J. Chapman and R. Shay, supra, at 3.
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the various theories upon which these decisions have proceeded. In
addition, a number of state statutes limiting the applicability of holder
in due course in consumer transactions will be discussed, including
the pertinent provisions of the recently promulgated Uniform Con-
sumer Credit Code. The conclusion will suggest that neither of these
approaches currently affords the consumer adequate protection against
a holder in due course and will propose minimum requisites for effec-
tive statutory protection.
I. JUDICIAL LIMITATIONS
A number of courts faced with suits against consumers by fi-
nancing assignees of sellers have manifested a discernible reluctance
to mechanically apply the holder in due course doctrine. This reluc-
tance might be expected when the facts of the case suggest probable
fraud by the seller, or when such an application will result in obvious
injustice to the consumer. However, the overall judicial response to
compelling fact situations and victimized consumers has been charac-
terized as both uncertain and unpredictable.' The unpredictable aspect
of the decisions is due primarily to the variety of theories which have
been employed by the courts in finding for the consumer. Section 3-305
of the U.C.C. renders the finance company, once it has qualified as a
holder in due course, immune to "personal"' defenses. This immunity
has been transferred from the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law,"
(hereinafter U.N.I.L.) which was initially approved by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1896. Con-
sequently, courts which desire to rule in favor of the consumer in
controversies involving a holder of the consumer's note must some-
how reconcile their decisions with a legal principle that has existed
in statutory form for over 70 years.'
Nevertheless, a number of courts faced with cases involving con-
sumer paper under both the U.N.I.L. and the U.C.C. have ruled for the
consumer. These decisions have proceeded upon several distinguishable
but overlapping theories: (1) finding the financer-assignee to have
been, in essence, a "co-participant" with the seller in the original trans-
action; (2) finding the relationship between the original seller and
the financer-assignee to have been one of "agency"; and (3) finding
that the financer acted in "bad faith" or had knowledge imputing
notice to him, thus disqualifying him as a holder in due course.
8 Littlefield, supra note 6, at 65.
0 See note 4 supra.
10 Section 57 of the U.N.I.L. provides:
Rights of a Holder in Due Course.—A holder in due course holds the instru-
ment free from any defect of title of prior parties, and free from defenses
available to prior parties among themselves, and may enforce payment of the
instrument for the full amount thereof against all parties liable thereon.
11 The states of Colorado, Connecticut, Florida and New York adopted the law in
1897, the year following its approval by the Commissioners. 5 Uniform Laws Ann.
XIII, Table III (1943).
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A. The Financing Agency as a "Co-participant" in
the Original Transaction
A common basis upon which courts have circumvented the neces-
sity of disallowing consumer defenses in a suit by a financing assignee
has been that of finding the financing company to have been too in-
timately involved with the assignor-seller's business transactions to
claim holder in due course status as a "detached" third party.
Theoretically, the financing agency which obtains a negotiable in-
strument in the course of business does so purely in the pursuit of
its own commercial endeavors and completely without knowledge of
the transaction which gave rise to the instrument. Notwithstanding
this theoretical ideal, the practicalities of modern financing have re-
sulted in considerably more direct participation on the part of financing
agencies in the transactions of their prospective assignors." An early
case denying an assignee's claim that he was an innocent purchaser of
a note and not subject to the buyer's defenses in a consumer trans-
action on the grounds that it was too intimately involved in the busi-
ness affairs of the seller was Commercial Credit Co. v. Childs." In that
case a finance company sued a consumer on a note executed in con-
nection with an automobile sale. When the consumer sought to defend
on the grounds that the vehicle was defective and that he had been
falsely induced to sign the contract, the finance company disclaimed
responsibility for these circumstances as an "innocent purchaser" of
the note. In refusing to recognize the finance company's status as
such, the court observed that the note being sued upon was attached
to the dealer's contract and bore on its back a printed form for assign-
ment to the finance company. Moreover, these instruments had been
supplied to the automobile dealer by the finance company and the note,
contract and assignment were all executed on the same day. On the
basis of these facts the court concluded:
We think appellant [finance company] was so closely
connected with the entire transaction or with the deal that it
12 1 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Consumer Installment
Credit, pt. 2, at 427 (1957); Jones, supra note 2, at 179; Littlefield, supra note 6, at
63-64; 75 Harv. L. Rev. 437, 438 (1961).
13 199 Ark. 1073, 137 S.W.2d 260 (1940). See 53 Harv. L. Rev. 1200 (1940) (approv-
ing the holding as "abandoning the test of the 'white heart and the empty head' in the
case of the transferee who is more like an original party to the transaction than a
subsequent purchaser. . . ."); Contra, Implement Credit Corp. v. Elsinger, 268 Wis. 143,
161, 66 N.W.2d 657, 666 (1954):
We can perceive of no reason based upon either logic or public policy why
a finance company or a bank which supplied such blank printed forms should
be held thereby to have constituted the dealers their agents, or should be deemed
to have participated in the sale by the dealer to the customer, including the
execution of any contract, mortgage, or note which the customer may have
executed to the dealer. For these reasons, this court does not consider the cases
of Commercial Credit Co. v. Childs . . . and Mutual Finance Co. v. Martin .. .
holding to \ the contrary on this point should be followed as precedents
in this state for we believe them to be based upon an unsound -premise.
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cannot be heard to say that it, in good faith, was an innocent
purchaser of the instrument for value before maturity. It
financed the deal, prepared the instrument, and on the day it
was executed took an assignment of it from the Arkansas
Motors, Incorporated. Even before it was executed it prepared
the written assignment thereon to itself. Rather than being a
purchaser of the instrument after its execution it was to all
intents and purposes a party to the agreement and instrument
from the beginning."
The reasoning of Commercial Credit Co. was adopted by the Su-
preme Court of California in Commercial Credit Corp. v. Orange
County Machine Works," a case involving a commercial rather than
a consumer transaction. In Orange County Machine Works, the finance
company had also supplied the seller with forms and had twice con-
sulted by telephone with the seller regarding the impending transaction.
It approved the details of the transaction and had advanced money to
the seller with the understanding that the contract and note would
be assigned or endorsed to the finance company immediately upon
consummation of the sale. The court observed:
In a very real sense, the finance company was a moving force
in the transaction from its very inception, and acted as a party
to it.
When a finance company actively participates in a trans-
action of this type from its inception, counselling and aiding
the future vendor-payee, it cannot be regarded as a holder
in due course of the note given in the transaction and the de-
fense of failure of consideration may properly be maintained."
In the later case of Mutual Finance Co. v. Martin,u the court,
citing both Commercial Credit Co. and Orange County Machine Works,
refused to recognize a finance company as a holder in due course in
a transaction for the purchase of a deep freezer. In the stipulated
statement of facts the finance company admitted that it had prepared
and furnished to the seller printed forms for the conditional sales
agreement with a promissory note attached. The printed forms des-
ignated the finance company as the specific assignee of both the con-
ditional sales contract and note. It was further stipulated that the
contract and note designated the finance company's office as the place
of payment, that the finance company had investigated the buyer's
credit standing, had approved the terms of the purchase in advance,
and had taken assignment of both contract and note the day after
14 199 Ark. at 1077, 137 S.W.2d at 262.
15 34 Cal. 2d 766, 214 P.2d 819 (1950).
15 id. at 771, 214 P.2d at 822.
17 63 So. 2d 649 (FIa. 1953). An annotation on Mutual Finance, dealing with trans-
ferees of commercial paper as subject to defenses which the buyer could assert against
the seller, appears at 44 A.L.R.2d 8 (1955).
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their execution. The deep freezer in Mutual Finance was stipulated to
have been faulty and wholly valueless for its intended purpose. On
the basis of these facts, the court declared:
We think, so far as the admitted facts in this case are con-
cerned, that the better rule is that approved in Commercial
Credit Co. v. Childs. . . 18
The court then quoted that portion of Commercial Credit Co. which
held the finance company to have been "to all intents and purposes a
party to the agreement and instrument from the beginning." 19
A classic example of an attempt to exploit the holder in due course
doctrine is presented in Westfield Inv. Co. v. Fellers." In Westfield,
the defendants were victims of a bogus freezer "food plan." A sales-
man from Ideal Home Food Service represented to them that if they
agreed to purchase $70 worth of food monthly for three years, Ideal
would supply them with a freezer and that at the end of the three year
period they would obtain title to the freezer absolutely free of charge.
On the strength of these representations the defendants signed Ideal's
"sales contract" and a promissory note. The instrument, which had
been supplied to Ideal by the finance company, contained a printed
assignment form designating the plaintiff finance company as exclu-
sive assignee. The forms signed by the defendants contained numerous
blanks, and the defendants subsequently discovered that the blanks
had been filled in to reflect purported obligations on their part to
purchase a freezer for $825, food for $111 and to pay finance charges
of $354.72. Thereafter, the defendants refused to make any payments.
The finance company, which had taken assignment of the note, re-
possessed the freezer and food, sold them, and then sued the defendants
for a deficiency judgment of $1,420.75. Noting the prevalence of such
"freezer plan" frauds, the court declined to allow the finance company
to claim holder in due course status as a bar to the buyer's defenses.
After a review of Commercial Credit Co., Orange County Machine
Works, and Mutual Finance, the court concluded:
[T] his court is of the opinion that Westfield Investment Com-
pany, not only by its actions and knowledge of the situation
prevailing here and in similar freezer deal transactions but
also in delivery to its selected dealer of an instrument which,
for all practical purposes could be negotiated only to it, be-
came so inextricably a part of the original transaction with
the purchaser that it could not thereafter stand aloof in the
role of a holder in due course in good faith.21
18 63 So. 2d at 652.
19 Id. at 653.
20 74 N.J. Super. 575, 181 A.2d 809 (L. Div. 1962).
21
 Id. at 590-91, 181 A.2d at 818. But see Waterbury Say. Bank v. Jaroszewski, 4
Conn. Cir. 620, 238 A.2d 446 (Cir. Ct. 1967) (bank found to be bolder in due course of
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The judicial trend of denying holder in due course status to fi-
nance companies which are too intimately involved with the assignor-
seller was contained in a recent case, Unico v. Owen.22 Unico involved
another consumer "bargain" in which the buyer, in return for his
agreement to purchase 140 stereo albums over an extended period of
time, was to have received, "without separate charge," a new stereo
player. The contract and note signed by the defendants stated that
the payments should be made to Universal Stereo Corporation, the
seller. However, on the reverse side of the note appeared an elaborate
printed form of endorsement which provided for assignment of the
note to Unico, a financing company. The purchasers defaulted on their
payments when they failed to receive any more albums after initial
delivery of 12 albums. The court observed that Unico was a partner-
ship formed expressly for the purpose of financing Universal Stereo,
and that by the terms of the contract between Unico and Universal,
Unico agreed to lend Universal up to 35 percent of the value of all
contracts assigned to Unico. In return for this agreement Universal
submitted to a substantial degree of control of its entire business
operation by Unico. The court commented:
This general outline of the Universal-Unico financing
agreement serves as evidence that Unico not only had a thor-
ough knowledge of the nature and method of operation of
Universal's business, but also exercised extensive control
over it. Moreover, obviously it had a large, if not decisive,
hand in the fashioning and supplying of the form of contract
and note used by Universal, and particularly in setting the
terms of the record album sales agreement, which were de-
signed to put the buyer-consumer in an unfair and burdensome
legal straight jacket and to bar any escape no matter what the
default of the seller, while permitting the note-holder, con-
tract-assignee to force payment from him by enveloping itself
in the formal status of holder in due course. To say the rela-
tionship between Unico and the business operations of Uni-
versal was close, and that Unico was involved therein, is to
put it mildly.'
After a discussion of Orange County Machine Works and the sub-
sequent cases holding similarly, the court concluded:
In our judgment the views expressed in the cited cases
provide the sound solution to the problem under consideration.
note executed in connection with freezer food plan when evidence disclosed that out of
500 to 600 similar financing transactions only 3 or 4 complaints had been received from
customers); James Talcott, Inc. v. Schulman, 82 N.J. Super. 438, 198 A.2d 98 (App.
Div. 1964) (distinguishing Westfield on the grounds that in addition to supplying the
seller with forms there were many other circumstances in Westfield to indicate actual
knowledge on the part of the finance company of the activities of the seller).
22 50 N.J. 101', 232 A.2d 405 (1967).
23 Id. at 115, 232 A.2d at 413.
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Under the facts of our case the relationship between Unico
and Universal, and the nature of Unico's participation in Uni-
versal's contractual arrangements with its customers, if any-
thing are closer and more active than in any of those cases,
and in justice Unico could not be deemed a holder in due
course of the Owen note. 24
In American Plan Corp. v. Woods," a fast-talking salesman in-
duced the consumer to purchase a water softener for her home. The
sales arrangement involved a "referral scheme" whereby the consumer
would be paid $50 for the name of each prospective customer supplied
to the seller, Crystal Clear Incorporated. The consumer mailed form
letters to her friends and supplied Crystal Clear with the names of
40 people, many of whom subsequently purchased water softeners,
but she received only $100 for her efforts. The finance company in-
volved in the case had approved of the referral plan in advance, had
supplied Crystal Clear with notes and other forms, had established a
carrying charge of $215 for each note, had reserved the right to refuse
any note it felt was risky, and personally investigated the credit of each
purchaser whose note was offered to it. The consumer had executed
one of these notes and the finance company had purchased it. The
evidence indicated that she had been given to understand that the
machine was being given to her for "advertising" and that she did not
intend to buy a water softener. In permitting the buyer to raise her
defenses the court adopted the holding in Unico:
As that court stated, we are impelled to "join those courts
which deny the holder in due course status in consumer goods
sales cases to those financers whose involvement with the
seller's business is as close, and whose knowledge of the ex-
trinsic factors—i.e., the terms of the underlying sale agree-
ment—is as pervasive, as it is in the present case." 26
A very recent decision of the Supreme Court of Delaware has fol-
lowed the foregoing line of precedents in refusing to recognize a finance
company affiliated with a seller of precut homes as a holder in due course
under the U.N.I.L. 27 In Jones v. Approved Bancredit Corp.,' a sales-
man representing the seller presented the consumer with a jumble of
forms for signing. When she requested time to consult an attorney, he
asserted that this would be a waste of time, and that if the forms were
not signed immediately, construction of her home would be substan-
tially delayed. The consumer finally acquiesced and signed a mortgage,
a judgment bond and warrant, a promissory note, a construction con-
24 Id. at 122, 232 A.2d at 416.
25 16 Ohio App. 2d 1, 240 N.E.2d 886 (1968).
26 Id. at 6, 240 N.E.2d at 889.
27 The
 promissory note was executed before the effective date of the U.C.C. in
Delaware.
28	 Del.	 256 A.2d 739 (1969).
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tract, a request for insurance, an affidavit that the masonry work and
foundation were completed and paid for (when in fact none of the
work had been commenced) and an affidavit that no materials were
delivered or work started as of the date of the mortgage. The promis-
sory note in the amount of $3,250 ($2,500 principal plus $750 in
"charges") was immediately assigned to Bancredit Corporation which
paid the seller $2,250 for the $3,250 obligation. During construction
an employee of the builder drove a bulldozer into the side of the
partially-completed structure and knocked it off its foundation. The
seller disclaimed any responsibility for this occurrence deeming it
"a work of God," and the builder refused to proceed further with con-
struction. County authorities declared the building site unsafe and the
consumer was required to raze the remnants of the building and filI
the basement at considerable personal expense. Later, the seller ter-
minated its business and closed its offices.
Thereafter Bancredit foreclosed on the mortgage and sued the
consumer for an unpaid balance of $2,560.23 plus interest. The lower
court directed a verdict for Bancredit on the ground that it was a holder
in due course, and that the consumer's defenses of fraud could not be
raised against it. The depositions of the parties established that the
original seller and Bancredit were wholly-owned subsidiaries of Albee
Homes Inc. Bancredit was described as a "finance department" of Albee
which obtained 99 percent of its business from the seller and similar
sales subsidiaries of Albee. Bancredit and Albee had the same officers
and directors and Albee named the directors and officers of the seller.
Moreover, Bancredit had exclusive power of approval over any trans-
action tendered by the seller and had the power to impose special con-
ditions on any purchase. The Supreme Court of Delaware, after a
review of many of the authorities discussed above, reversed the lower
court, observing:
Under the totality of facts and circumstances of this
case, we hold that the rule of balance should be adopted and
applied; that it should operate in favor of the installment
buyer for the reason that, in our opinion, Bancredit was so
involved in the transaction that it may not be treated as a sub-
sequent purchaser for value. By reason of its sister corpora-
tion relationship to Dell [the seller] and the established course
of dealing between them, Bancredit was more nearly an ori-
ginal party to the transaction than a subsequent purchaser of
the paper; and, for the reasons of fairness and balance stated
in the foregoing authorities, Bancredit should be denied the
protected status of holder in due course which would prevent
Mrs. Jones from having her day in court on the defenses she
would have otherwise had against Dell. 29
Generally, these cases have proceeded largely upon the theory
29
 Id, at 	  256 A.2d at 743.
98
HOLDER IN DUE COURSE
that the finance company had become, in effect, a partner in the trans-
actions of the dealer. One recurring feature in the fact patterns of
many of the cases is the supplying of forms to the dealer by the finance
company. It is apparent, however, that no clear rule has been estab-
lished. In the Unico case the court employed a "transactional" approach
in determining whether the relationship between the finance company
and the dealer was too "pervasive":
For purposes of consumer goods transactions, we hold
that where the seller's performance is executory in character
and when it appears from the totality of the arrangements be-
tween dealer and financer that the financer has had a sub-
stantial voice in setting standards for the underlying trans-
action, or has approved the standards established by the
dealer, and has agreed to take all or a predetermined or sub-
stantial quantity of the negotiable paper which is backed by
such standards, the financier should be considered a partic-
ipant in the original transaction and therefore not entitled to
holder in clue course status." (Emphasis added.)
The approach in Westfield was similar. There the court qualified its
holding in the following language:
This court is not about to hold that the mere supplying of
negotiable forms in blank by the financing company to a ven-
dor is sufficient to strip the financing company of its holder
in due course status. However, this court is saying that the
supplying of such forms is one of the factors to be looked at
in defining the relationship existing between the parties,
namely, the vendor, the financing company and the maker."
The Jones court also considered "the totality of the facts and circum-
stances"' in making its findings.
It would appear that the degree of involvement in the seller's
business on the part of the financer, previous course of dealings be-
tween the seller and the financer, the degree of control exercised by
the financer over the transaction in question, the corporate relation-
ship, if any, between the seller and financer and the details of the
assignment itself have all been factors considered by the courts in
reaching the conclusion that a given financer participated too closely
with the seller to avail himself of the status of a holder in due course.
This transactional approach to the problem also appears in the "agency"
theory under which some courts have avoided the necessity of allow-
ing holder in due course to preclude a consumer's defenses.
B. Financer-Seller Agency Relationship
Some courts have determined that the degree of control exer-
20 50 N.J. at 122-23, 232 A.2d at 417.
81 74 N.J. Super. at 585, 181 A.2d at 815.
32	 Del. —, 256 A.2d at 743.
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cised by a finance company over a given seller's business transactions
was sufficient to justify considering the seller as the agent of the
finance company, thereby making the finance company, as principal,
the true party to the original transaction. Thus; "personal" defenses
arising out of the original transaction could be raised directly against
the finance company, This implied agency theory appeared in West-
field when the court observed:
In the case at bar this court believes that when Rosen
[the salesman] approached the defendants and induced them
to sign the sales contract with Ideal and the single page con-
ditional sales contract and promissory note containing in bold
type the name of Westfield Investment Company as the spe-
cific assignee . . . he was to this extent at least acting as the
agent of Westfield." (Emphasis added.)
In the recent case of Calvert Credit Corp. v. Williams," a number of
customers were defrauded through a "referral plan" involving the
purchase of television sets. When the television sets proved to be de-
fective, the consumers defaulted in their payments and the finance
company, holder of the notes they had executed in connection with
their purchases, brought suit. In refusing to recognize the finance com-
pany as a bolder in due course, the court stated:
Appellant [finance company] prearranged finance charges and
approved the "Referral Plan." It also approved each customer.
Without that approval, even a customer who had signed a
sales contract was unable to get a television from Interstate
[seller]. A jury could properly have concluded that appellant
was so intimately involved in every step of the sales process
that Interstate was, in fact, appellant's agent.'
An earlier case, Palmer v. Associates Discount Corp." applied an
intriguing variation of the "agency" theory. In that case a finance com-
pany sought to interpose the defense of holder in due course to bar
claims by the purchaser of an automobile that the condition of the
car had been misrepresented to him and that the vehicle was unsafe.
As in many of the cases examined, the finance company had supplied
to the seller printed forms bearing an assignment to itself on the back.
However, the promissory note used in this transaction also designated
on its face the finance company, Associates Discount Corporation,
as the party to receive payments. The court interpreted this as an ap-
38 74 N.J. Super. at 589, 181 A.2d at 817.
84 244 A.2d 494 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1968).
35
 Id. at 496. See also, Morgan v. Reasor Corp., 69 Cal. 2d 881, 894, 407, 447 P.2d
638, 647, 73 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1968) (dictum):
As has been suggested by other courts, the gravamen of the Commercial
Credit rule is that the seller accepts the buyer's note and extends credit, not on
his own behalf, but as an agent for the finance company. (Emphasis added.)
86 124 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir. 1941).
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pointment of the finance company as the dealer's agent to receive pay-
ment, observing:
As appellee was named on the face of the note as the dealer's
agent to receive payment, it is reasonable to infer that it
was in possession of the note and demanded payment in that
capacity. . . . The circumstance that an agent to receive pay-
ment suddenly assumes the new role of bolder in due course
after refusal of payment, is itself enough to cast doubt on the
good faith of its holding."
The obvious similarities between this "implied agency" approach
of linking the finance company with the original seller and other cases
simply holding that the finance company was too intimately involved
in the transaction have prompted the observation that fact patterns of
this nature should be treated simply as identity of parties situations."
C. Financing Agency's "Bad Faith" or "Notice"
A number of courts, particularly when faced with consumer
credit transactions suggestive of fraud or other deceptive business
practices, have thoroughly scrutinized the entire transaction in an
effort to discover evidence that the holder of the note did not meet
the requirements of having obtained the note "in good faith" or "with-
out notice" of irregularities or of claims and defenses." Actual bad
faith has been found when the assignee is shown to have had knowledge
of the poor business reputation of his assignor.
In Financial Credit Corp. v. Williams," the plaintiffs had been
fraudulently induced by a salesman for a home improvement firm to
sign a mortgage and a negotiable note in the amount of $6,399.60 for
an improvement job they had understood would cost only $3,200. The
plaintiffs brought suit to have the note and mortgage declared void.
The court noted that the note and mortgage were purchased by the
defendant finance company as part of a "package deal" involving some
480 such instruments, and that the notes were discounted by over 80
percent. Moreover, the finance company was shown to have been aware
of the fact that the home improvement concern from which it obtained
the notes had a notorious reputation throughout the state for fraud
and deceptive business practices. On these facts, the court concluded
that the finance company had taken the note in bad faith and could
not claim holder in due course status.'
In a second type of situation, the courts have been able to deny
the finance company holder in due course status on grounds of imputed
or implied bad faith. Typically these fact situations involve circum-
stances sufficiently suspicious as to compel some sort of inquiry on
27 Id. at 228.
38 Littlefield, supra note 6, at 67.
39 U.C.C. § 3-302, 3-304.
40 246 Md. 575, 229 A.2d 712 (1967).
41 Id. at 585, 229 A.2d at 716-17.
101
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
the part of the financing agency prior to taking the note. When financ-
ing agencies faced with such circumstances fail to make inquiry, the
courts have, on occasion, held that this constitutes sufficient evidence
of bad faith to justify disallowing their claim to holder in due course
status. The defendants in Norman v. Worldwide Distribs, biz ,42
were the victims of a fradulent "chain referral scheme," involving
the purchase of a breakfront, and were being sued by the finance com-
pany which had purchased their promissory note. The finance company
in question was shown to have dealt with the seller of the breakfront
under three different trade names within a year. The vice president
of the finance company admitted that he was aware of the referral
plan but claimed that he was "not familar with the details" of that
plan. In striking down the finance company's contention that it was
a holder in due course, the court declared:
Under alI the circumstances, Peoples [finance company] was
bound to inquire further into the operation of the seller of
these notes, and having made no inquiry, it is held as though
it had knowledge of all that inquiry would have revealed.'
In Local Acceptance Co. v. Kinkade," the court stated that
claims of "knowledge" or "bad faith" on the part of the plaintiff
finance company were available to the defendants to defeat the plain-
tiff's claim of holder in due course status." The defendants had chosen
the "knowledge" theory. They had purchased a sewing machine under
an arrangement whereby payments would be made "in kind" by sew-
ing pre-cut garments which the seller agreed to furnish each month.
The transaction, however, involved the execution of a promissory note
which the seller subsequently assigned to the plaintiff, a finance com-
pany. When, after several months, the seller stopped providing the
pre-cut garments to the defendants, the finance company brought suit
on the note. The evidence adduced at trial indicated that the finance
company, through its manager, knew that all sales transacted by the
sewing machine company were to be arranged on this "sewing plan"
basis. Thus, the finance company had sufficient knowledge to suspect
that something was wrong when the sewing machine company offered
to assign a note supposedly obtained through the outright sale of a
sewing machine. The court affirmed a verdict for the defendants and
held that there was no error in the trial court's instruction that if the
finance company obtained the note with "knowledge" of the "sewing
plan" employed by the seller, it stood in the position of the seller and
was therefore not a holder in due course. 46
A very typical holder in due course issue appeared in Nationwide
42 202 Pa. Super. 53, 195 A.2d 115 (1963).
42 Id. at 59, 195 A.2d at 118.
44 361 S.W.2d 830 (Mo. 1962).
45 Id. at 834.
46 Id. at 835.
102
HOLDER IN DUE COURSE
Acceptance Corp. v. Henne." There the promissory note which the de-
fendants signed in connection with a food plan purchase was subse-
quently altered. The figure $100 as the amount due on the note had
been erased and replaced with the figure $843.48. In addition, the num-
ber of monthly installments had been changed from four to thirty-six.
Since the alterations and erasures on the note were "obvious to the
naked eye," the instrument acquired by the plaintiff was not "com-
plete and regular upon its face," as required by Section 52 of the
U.N.I.L. Such irregularity constituted notice to the finance company
of the defendant's defenses, thereby disqualifying the plaintiff as a
holder in due course."
The cases discussed disclose that in a number of circumstances
consumers can be protected by the requirements of the holder in due
course doctrine itself. Frequently consumer transactions entail ex-
tensive involvement in the seller's business, or circumstances amount-
ing to bad faith or notice, on the part of the financer. But these cases
have little impact in transactions involving more legitimate financing
arrangements between sellers and financers. The difficult question
remains who ought to bear the burden of a seller's voluntary or invol-
untary default, the relatively defenseless consumer or the financer
with the resources to protect himself before or after the default? Even
in appropriate circumstances the consumer faces difficult evidentiary
problems. And where such evidence might be available, the bulk of
consumers needing relief may be financially unable or psychologically
unprepared to mount a protracted defense in which ultimate success,
more often than not, will depend upon the uncertain hope of prevail-
ing on appeal. Thus, while affording relief to the aggressive consumer,
whose case presents facts analogous to those reviewed above, such
ad hoc decisions by appellate courts fall considerably short of pro-
viding satisfactory remedies for most aggrieved consumers in holder
in due course situations.
Nor did the enactment of the U.C.C., which has supplanted the
significantly better this situation, for the rule that the holder
in due course is immune to defenses on the underlying contract has
been transmitted to the Code from the U.N.I.L. In the drafting of
Article 9 of the U.C.C., dealing with secured transactions, the question
of the consumer-buyer and his defenses reportedly "led to violent con-
troversy."49 Professor Grant Gilmore, who served as Associate Reporter
for the drafting of Article 9 from 1946 to 1952, recounts that in the
early stages of drafting, "a comprehensive treatment of the problem
of consumer finance had been contemplated."" However, due to the
ensuing controversy, the plan was eventually abandoned and the pro-
47 194 So. 2d 434 (La. 1967).
45 Id. at 435.
49 Gilmore, The Assignee of Contract Rights and His Precarious Security, 74 Yale
L.J. 217, 232 (1964).
50 Id. See also Gilmore, The Secured Transactions Article of the Commercial Code,
16 Law & Contemn. Prob. 27, 45 (1951).
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tection of consumers was left to the courts or to the legislative enact-
ments of individual states." A number of states have, in varying degree,
acted to cover this area left open by the authors of the U.C.C. and
have passed a variety of statutes regulating consumer transactions.
II. Present Statutory Solutions
Some state statutes are specifically intended to preserve con-
sumer defenses against the seller's assignees. Essentially these statutes
take one of two basic approaches. They either (1) prohibit the use of
negotiable notes in consumer transactions, or (2) provide that sub-
sequent assignees of consumer notes are subject to any defenses which
the buyer may have against the seller." Within these two categories
there are, of course, numerous variations in specific approach, as the
following survey of the statutes in each category will demonstrate. 53
A. Prohibitions Against the Use of Negotiable Notes
in Consumer Transactions.
Six jurisdictions have enacted statutes prohibiting the use of
negotiable notes in consumer transactions.' Some of these statutes are
limited in scope to installment sales of "goods" 55 and some are more
general in coverage, applying to installment sales of "services" as
Indicative of this final resolution of the conflict is the wording of U.C.C. § 9-206
(I) which states:
Subject to any statute or decision which establishes a different rule for buyers
or lessees of consumer goods, an agreement by a buyer or lessee that he will
not assert against an assignee any claim or defense which he may have against
the seller or lessor is enforceable by an assignee who takes his assignment for
value, in good faith and without notice of a claim or defense, except as to
defenses of a type which may be asserted against a holder in due course of
a negotiable instrument under the Article on Commercial Paper (Article 3).
(Emphasis added.)
52
 75 Harv. L. Rev. 437, 438 (1961).
55 Some states have enacted "home solicitation sales" acts which, as their title sug-
gests, are designed primarily for the regulation of door-to-door sales. Due to their limited
applicability, these acts will not be treated here; however, the following are worthy of
note, for comparison of the indicated provisions with corresponding provisions of the
statutes discussed infra: Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 42-134 to -143 (Supp. 1969) (notes
or "other evidence of indebtedness" taken in connection with a home solicitation sale
declared non-negotiable; holder in due course of illegal note may enforce it. § 42-136) ;
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 320:1 to :22 (1966), as amended, (Supp. 1969) (negotiable
instruments, except checks, prohibited in sales by "hawkers or peddlers"; no waivers of
defenses by buyer permitted. §§ 320:21-a, 320:21-b); R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. §§ 6-28-1
to -8 (Spec. Supp. 1968) (notes must be marked "Non-negotiable consumer note";
assignees of such notes are subject to buyer's defenses. § 6-28-6).
64 Cal. Civ. Code § 1810.9 (West Supp. 1968) (recently renumbered § 1810.7,
effective Nov. 10, 1969; see 1 CCH Consumer Credit Guide 6071 at 11,624 (1969));
Del. Code Ann, tit. 6, § 4342 (Supp. 1968); Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 476-18(c) (1968); Mass.
Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 255, § 12C (Supp. 1969); N,Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 403(1) (McKinney
1962); P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 10, § 748 (Supp. 1968).
55 Hawaii Rev. Stat. §§ 476-18, 476-1 (1968); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 255, § 12C
(Supp. 1969).
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well." Those covering services resolve in advance such questions as
whether contracts to install aluminum siding, fire detection systems,
carpeting, and the like are excluded from the coverage of the statute
on the grounds that they are installment "service contracts" rather
than "installment sales" of goods.' Essentially, statutes of this nature
attempt to solve the problem of holder in due course in consumer
transactions by eliminating the source of the problem, the theory being
that if there are no notes to assign, there will be no assignees to claim
holder in due course status. Unfortunately, the statutes do not always
attain this result.
In jurisdictions which permit waivers of defenses against assignees
of consumer paper under Section 9-206( 1)" of the U.C.C., sellers are
afforded a potential means of avoiding the intended effect of statutes
prohibiting the use of negotiable notes. By simply including in the
buyer's sales contract a clause waiving his defenses against assignees,
a seller may endow the contract with virtually the same aspects of
negotiability as a promissory note. Thus, unless a given jurisdiction
also has a statute prohibiting waivers of defenses against assignees
in consumer installment contracts, sellers may be provided with a
ready-made "loophole."
It is arguable that this should not be the result under these circum-
stances, however, since a statute prohibiting negotiable instruments
in consumer transactions evidences an obvious legislative policy ad-
verse to devices which would serve to cut off consumer defenses against
assignees. The policy thus established should evidence "a different
rule" for consumer transactions, within the meaning of the qualifying
introductory language of U.C.C. Section 9-206. A contrary rule would
obviously allow facile circumvention of the consumer protection stat-
utes. Public policy alone should militate against such a result.
Several of the jurisdictions which prohibit negotiable notes in
consumer transactions have also banned clauses in installment con-
tracts which purport to waive the buyer's defenses against assignees,
thereby precluding sellers from utilizing this device as a means of
avoiding the intended effect of the consumer protection statutes. In
some statutory schemes the prohibition of such waivers is unqualified,"
but in several others an assignee may enforce a waiver of defenses
58 Cal. Civ. Code, § 1802.5 (West Supp. 1968); Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 4301 (Supp.
1968); N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law §§ 403(1), 401(7) (McKinney 1962); P.R. Laws Ann. tit.
10, § 731(5) (Supp. 1968).
57
 But see the New York statute which prohibits the use of negotiable notes in
other retail installment transactions but makes an exception in the case of "the furnish-
ing of goods or services for repairs, alterations or improvements upon or in connection
with real propety." The note must bear a conspicuous statement to the effect that it
arose out of a transaction involving real property but, given compliance with the statute,
a subsequent holder of the note can be a holder in due course. N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law,
§ 403(2) (McKinney 1962).
58 See note 51 supra.
59 Cal. Civ. Code § 1804.1(a) (West Supp. 1963); Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 476-18(b)
(1968); Mass. Gen. Laws - Ann. ch . 255D, § 10(6) (Supp. 1969).
105
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
in the buyer's contract provided he gives the buyer notice of the
assignment in writing and informs him that he must notify the assignee,
in writing and within a prescribed period, of any claims or defenses
which he may have." If the buyer fails to give such notice to the
assignee within the specified time period, the waiver clause may then
be enforced.
Generally, the statutory time period within which the buyer must
notify the assignee of his defenses is relatively short." This point has
received a certain amount of criticism, 62 the main objection being that
many of the buyer's defenses may not become known to him in a
short period of time. Thus, under statutes permitting this procedure
for validation of waivers of defenses, buyers would lose the right to
raise defenses such as subsequent malfunctioning of the item pur-
chased, non-performance by the seller under a protracted service or
warranty agreement, or non-performance of any other obligations of
the seller which are still executory when the buyer receives notice of
the assignment. Moreover, in placing upon the buyer the burden of
providing an assignee with prompt, written notice of claims or defenses,
these statutes work to the detriment of consumers who are illiterate,
blind, unable to comprehend the meaning of the assignee's "notice"
soliciting defenses," or are simply careless about reading and answer-
ing their mail. Perhaps in response to such objections, some statutes
now provide that if, by the terms of a contract for services, the seller's
performance will not be completed within the established statutory
period after the assignee mails notice of assignment to the buyer, the
assignee takes the contract or obligation subject to any defenses pred-
icated upon subsequent events."
The State of Delaware provides one other exception under which
6° Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 4312 (Supp, 1968); N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 403(3)(a)
(McKinney Supp. 1968); P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 10, § 749(a) (Supp. 1968).
" New York and Puerto Rico allow 10 days from the date upon which the assignee
mails his notice of assignment to the buyer; Delaware allows 15 days.
62 See, e.g., 75 Harv. L. Rev. 437, 439-40 (1961).
63 The statutes often specify the wording of the notice to be used. The New York
statute, for example, requires this wording in bold type:
Notice:
1. If the written statement of your transaction with the seller is not correct in every
respect; or
2. If the vehicle or goods described in or in an enclosure with this notice have not
been delivered to you by the seller or are not now in your possession; or
3. If the seller has not fully performed all his agreements with you; you must
notify the assignee in writing at the address indicated in or in an enclosure with
this notice within ten days from the date of the mailing of this notice; otherwise,
you will have no right to assert against the assignee any right of action or defense
arising out of the sale which you might otherwise have against the seller.
N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 403(3)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1968). It seems apparent that such
a form of "notice" with its reference to "your transaction," "assignee," and "right of
action or defense," will not prove very informative to the poor, the uneducated or the
unintelligent.
64 N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 403(3) (a) (McKinney Supp. 1968); P.R. Laws Ann., tit.
10, § 749(f) (Supp. 1968).
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waivers of defenses against assignees may be enforced. If the assignee
acquired the contract or evidence of indebtedness "relying in good
faith" upon a certificate of completion or certificate of satisfaction
signed by the buyer, the buyer will be foreclosed from asserting de-
fenses against the assignee.° 5 The statute requires that such a certificate
of completion or satisfaction bear a conspicuous warning to the buyer
not to sign the certificate until the seller's performance is fully and
satisfactorily completed." However, if an unscrupulous seller were to
include such a certificate amid the jumble of confusing forms confront-
ing the buyer in the typical credit transaction, there is at least the
possibility that the buyer would unwittingly sign the certificate, not-
withstanding the "conspicuous" warning. If he does and the install-
ment contract contains a waiver of defenses against assignees, a good
faith assignee of the contract would be able to enforce the obligation
regardless of the buyer's defenses.
Finally, it must be emphasized that statutes prohibiting the use
of negotiable notes implicitly allow the good faith holder of a note
illegally obtained by the seller to enforce the note, since under U.C.C.
Section 3-305 (1) a holder in due course takes an instrument free from
all defenses. Presumably this would include the defense that the note
was illegally obtained, and a holder would be free to enforce the
obligation represented by such a note. It should be noted in this con-
nection that the exception for illegality of the transaction contained
in U.C.C. Section 3-305 (2) (b) refers only to such illegality "as renders
the obligation of the party a nullity." None of the statutes discussed
above relieve the buyer of his obligation to pay when the seller obtains
from the buyer a negotiable instrument in violation of the statute. It
would seem, however, that a provision to this effect would provide an
effective sanction in such circumstances. Although some statutes re-
quire that promissory notes taken from consumers be labelled "con-
sumer note,"" and expressly declare them to be non-negotiable, it is
arguable that this requirement actually enhances the position of a
subsequent holder of an unmarked and illegally procured note. The
holder, in addition to claiming good faith, could argue that the require-
ments of the statute entitle him to assume that an unmarked note did
not originate in a consumer transaction.
Generally, there are criminal penalties which may be imposed
upon sellers who violate the statutes by taking unmarked negotiable
notes from consumers." Moreover, some jurisdictions prohibit the
65 Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 4312 (Supp. 1968).
66 Id.
67 Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 476-36 (1968); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 255, § 12C, (Supp.
1969).
68 Cal. Civ. Code § 1812.6 (West Supp. 1968); Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 4347 (Supp.
1968) (subject to misdemeanor penalties); Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 476-36 (1968) (fines
from $100 to $500); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 255, § 12C (Supp. 1969) (fines from
$100 to $500); N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law, § 414(1) (McKinney 1962) (fines up to $500);
P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 10, § 792 (Supp. 1968) (administrative fines from $100 to $1000; or
107
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
collection of any finance, service, delinquency, penalty or related
charge by a seller or assignee who knowingly takes an illegal note, and
the buyer is allowed to recover from the seller any such charges which
have already been imposed." This sort of "civil" sanction has received
favorable comment since, theoretically, it gives the buyer a personal
pecuniary interest in the enforcement of installment sales laws and
thereby encourages consumers to play an active role in ferreting out
violations by selIers. 70
 However, since a holder in due course, by
definition, has taken the note in good faith and without knowledge of
its illegal origin, he is therefore free to enforce it against the consumer.
The existence of sanctions against culpable parties affords meager
consolation to the deceived consumer who discovers that in this sit-
uation, despite the statute's purported effect of preventing holders in
due course from precluding his defenses, he is still barred from raising
them.
Hawaii has eliminated this result by combining the prohibition
against negotiable instruments in consumer sales with a general pro-
vision to the effect that no rights of action or defenses which the buyer
has against the seller shall be cut off by assignment." The statute
further provides that, if the buyer has valid defenses arising out of
the transaction with the seller, the assignee has recourse against the
seller to recoup any losses suffered as a result of the buyer's defenses. 72
This preservation of the buyer's defenses against assignees constitutes
the nucleus of the statutory schemes in those states which have adopted
the second technique of limiting the application of holder in due course
in consumer situations. Hawaii's statute, by combining the two
elements, eliminates some of the problems of both, and thus is probably
the most effective of the state statutes.
B. Statutes Providing That Subsequent Holders Take Subject to the
Buyer's Defenses
Four states, Maryland, Rhode Island, Vermont and Washington,
have enacted statutes providing that subsequent holders of a negotiable
note taken in connection with a consumer transaction are subject to
any defenses the buyer may have arising out of the original transac-
tion." One of those statutes applies only to transactions involving
goods,' while the rest apply to transactions involving both goods and
prosecution for misdemeanor with possible fines to $1000 or up to 2 years imprisonment
or both).
69 Cal. Civ. Code § 1812.7 (West Supp. 1968) ; Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 4348 (Supp.
1968) ; Hawaii Rev. Stat. §§ 476-22, -36 (1968) ; Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 255, § 12C
(Supp. 1969) ; N.V. Pers. Prop. Law § 414(2) (McKinney 1962).
70 75 Harv. L. Rev. 437, 438-39 (1961).
71 Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 476-18(d) (1968).
72 Id.
73 Md. Ann. Code art. 83, § 147 (1965) ; R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 6-27-6 (Spec.
Supp. 1968) ; Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 9, § 2455 (Supp. 1969) ; Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 63.14.020
(Supp. 1968).
74 Md. Ann. Code art. 83, § 152(b) (1965).
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services.76
 One statute is also restricted in its coverage to secured
transactions," whereas the others contain no such restriction. Two of
the statutes refer specifically to "installment sales," 77 while the others
employ much broader language and appear to cover all types of credit
sales.78
 In Rhode Island a note taken in connection with a consumer
transaction is required by law to bear the legend "non-negotiable con-
sumer note,"" and in Washington the note must contain a statement
to the effect that assignment will not cut off as to third parties any
right of action or defense which the buyer may have against the
seller.' Maryland requires that the note specifically mention the in-
stallment agreement from which it issued, 81 while the Vermont statute
simply provides that a subsequent holder of a promissory note or in-
strument or other evidence of indebtedness of a consumer takes subject
to all defenses which would be available to the consumer in an action
on a simple contract, and to all rights available to him under the
Consumer Fraud statute.'
Apparently three of the states which provide that holders of
consumer instruments are subject to the buyer's defenses arising out
of the sale do not expressly prohibit waivers of defenses against as-
signees in sales contracts." As in the case of statutes prohibiting the
use of negotiable notes, unless the jurisdiction prohibits such waivers
of defenses in the sales contract itself, it would seem that sellers might
be able to utilize such waivers to endow sales contracts with the basic
attributes of a negotiable instrument. This problem is somewhat com-
pounded by U.C.C. Section 9-206 which, in addition to authorizing
express agreements to waive defenses against assignees of the contract,
contains the following provision:
A buyer who as part of one transaction signs both a negotia-
ble instrument and a security agreement makes such an
agreement.
Thus, in jurisdictions which permit negotiable instruments to be
used but provide that subsequent holders take subject to the buyer's
defenses, the execution of a negotiable note in conjunction with a retail
installment contract containing a security agreement would give rise
to an "implied in law" agreement not to assert claims or defenses
75 R.I. Gen. Laws § 6-27-6 (Spec. Supp. 1968); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit, 9, §§ 2454, 2455
(Supp. 1969); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 63.14.010(5) (1966).
76 Md. Ann. Code art. 83, § 152(b) (1965).
77 Md, Ann. Code art. 83, § 147 (1965); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 63.14.020 (1966).
78 R.I. Gen. Laws § 6-27-6 (Spec. Supp. 1968) ; Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 9, §§ 2454, 2455
(Supp. 1969).
79 R.I. Gen. Laws § 6-27-6 (Spec. Supp. 1968).
80 Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 63.14.020 (Supp. 1968).
81 Md. Ann. Code art. 83, § 147 (1965).
82 Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 9, § 2455 (Supp. 1969).
83 A check of both statutory and decisional law in Rhode Island, Maryland and
Vermont has failed to reveal any express prohibition against waivers of defenses against
assignees in consumer contracts in these states.
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against an assignee of the contract." The question then arises whether
a subsequent assignee of the contract could invoke an actual or "im-
plied in law" waiver to defeat the effect of the statute providing that
subsequent holders of a negotiable instrument take subject to defenses.
Such a result, of course, would all but eviscerate the statute preserving
the buyer's defenses. It is arguable that the quoted provision of U.C.C.
Section 9-206 (1) refers to circumstances involving a negotiable instru-
ment which would, when negotiated, insulate a holder in due course
from the buyer's defenses. As indicated earlier, the enactment of a
statute removing this insulation with respect to consumer paper should
suffice to establish "a different rule" for consumers within the meaning
of the qualifying language which introduces U.C.C. Section 9-206(1). 85
The word "rule" as used in that language lends itself to interpretation
in a broad sense as meaning "policy." Thus, as in the case of statutes
prohibiting negotiable instruments in consumer transactions, this
manifest policy against precluding consumer defenses should, by nec-
essary implication, proscribe waivers of defenses, either actual or im-
plied in law. The State of Washington has avoided the whole problem
by flatly declaring that waivers of defenses in retail installment or
retail charge agreements are invalid."
As indicated earlier, several states require that consumer notes
be labelled as such, or require that an instrument taken in a consumer
transaction state on its face that transferees take subject to the
buyer's defenses. Thus, transferees of such instruments are fore-
warned of the fact that the defense of holder in due course is not
available to them in any controversy involving these instruments.
However, it is possible that an illegally obtained or unmarked note
may be transferred to a good faith assignee. In this circumstance, three
of the states presently under discussion would allow the transferee to
enforce the note as a holder in due course, since their statutes preserv-
ing the buyer's defenses appear to apply only to instruments which are
properly marked in compliance with the law.'" The Vermont statute,
however, imposes no such labelling requirement and simply provides
that the holder of a consumer's instrument is subject to the consumer's
defenses.
For several decades states have wrestled individually with the
consumer protection problem inherited by them when the Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws excluded this area from the U.C.C. In
the interim, however, the Commissioners mounted an effort to solve
the problem by means of a uniform law, specifically designed to reg-
84 See U.C.C. § 9-206, Comment 1, which states in part:
The execution of a negotiable note in connection with a security agreement is
given like effect as the execution of an agreement containing a waiver of defense
clause.
85 See p. 105 supra.
80 Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 63.14.150 (Supp. 1968).
87 Md. Ann. Code art. 83, § 147 (1965) ; R.I. Gen. Laws § 6-27-6 (Spec. Supp.
1968) ; Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 63.14.020 (Supp. 1968).
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ulate consumer credit. This effort ultimately produced the Uniform
Consumer Credit Code (hereinafter U.C.C.C.) which received final
approval from the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws on July 30, 1968. Two states, Oklahoma and Utah, have
adopted the U.C.C.C." and it is a reasonable expectation that other
states will follow their lead. The U.C.C.C. includes provisions applica-
ble to holder in due course in consumer transactions.
III. THE U.C.C.C.
The U.C.C.C. bans the use of negotiable notes in consumer credit
transactions. Section 2-403 of the Code prohibits a seller or lessor in
a consumer credit sale or a consumer lease from taking any negotiable
instrument other than a check. The definition of "consumer credit
sale," contained in Section 2-104 of the Code, includes credit sales of
both goods and services by a seller who regularly engages in such
credit transactions." In addition, the definition provides that the buyer
must be a person other than an organization," and that the goods or
services must be purchased primarily for personal, family, household
or agricultural purposes." Credit card sales are expressly excluded."
However, there is no provision restricting the applicability of the
U.C.C.C. to sales involving a security interest. Consequently, the pro-
hibition against negotiable instruments is applicable to a broad range
of consumer sales. The Code also contains no requirement that in-
struments used in connection with a consumer transaction be dis-
tinguished by any particular labelling. Section 2-403 makes it clear
that if a seller takes a negotiable instrument in violation of the Code,
a subsequent "good faith" holder is entitled to enforce the instrument
as a holder in due course with the traditional insulation from the
buyer's defenses.
The Official Comment to section 2-403 suggests that the holder in
due course concept has been retained in situations involving a good
faith holder of an illegally obtained note for two reasons. First, it was
assumed that after enactment of the Code the prohibition against nego-
tiable instruments in consumer transactions would be "well-known"
in the financial community and that, consequently, situations involving
a bona fide holder of an illegally obtained consumer instrument would
be "rare." Secondly, it was felt that whenever such a situation did
arise, the policy favoring negotiability ought to be upheld "in order
not to cast a cloud over negotiable instruments generally.""
The draftsmen of the U.C.C.C. have offered two alternative ver-
88 Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 14A, §§ 1-101 to 9-103 (Supp. 1969); Utah Code Ann. tit.
70B, §§ 1-101 to 9-103 (Supp. 1969). Both jurisdictions adopted the U.C.C.C., effective
juIy 1, 1969.
U.C.C.C. § 2-104(1)(a).
99 U.C.C.C. § 2 -104(1)(b).
U.C.C.C. § 2 -104(1)(c).
92 U.C.C.C. § 2 -104(2)(a).
03 U.C.C.C. § 2-403, comment.
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sions of Section 2-404 of the Code governing waivers of defenses
against assignees. Alternative A is the more effective version and is
that adopted by the state of Utah. The provision states:
With respect to a consumer credit sale or consumer lease,
other than a sale or lease primarily for an agricultural pur-
pose, an assignee of the rights of the seller or lessor is subject
to all claims and defenses of the buyer or lessee against the
seller or lessor arising out of the sale or lease notwithstanding
an agreement to the contrary, but the assignee's liability
under this section may not exceed the amount owing to the
assignee at the time the claim or defense is asserted against
the assignee. Rights of the buyer or lessee under this section
can only be asserted as a matter of defense to or set-off
against a claim by the assignee.
Thus, Alternative A, in permitting the buyer to raise any defenses
he might have "notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary,"
effectively invalidates contract provisions purporting to waive the
buyer's defenses against assignees. The assignee is protected from af-
firmative suits through the proviso that the buyer's objections to the
contract can only be raised defensively.
Alternative B, which was adopted by the state of Oklahoma, pro-
vides that waivers of defenses against assignees may be enforced
provided the assignee is not "related to" the seller and has acquired
the contract for value and in good faith. Such waivers cannot be en-
forced, however, unless the assignee notifies the buyer of the assign-
ment in writing and within thirty days" receives no written notice of
the facts giving rise to any claim or defense on the part of the buyer.
This version further provides that the agreement to waive defenses is
only valid with respect to claims or defenses arising within the 30
day period following the date of notification by the assignee. Claims or
defenses arising after that time could validly be raised by the buyer
against the assignee." Under a statute patterned after Alternative B,
the consumer would risk losing only those defenses which arise during
the period covered by the assignee's notice. Thus, a shorter statutory
period for reply to the assignee would actually benefit the consumer,
since his period of "vulnerability" would be reduced. If defenses aris-
ing after the assignee's notice to the buyer has expired were not pre-
served, a longer period for response would be more advantageous to
the buyer, so that potential defenses as yet unknown to him would not
be prematurely foreclosed upon expiration of the notification period.
The U.C.C.C., while incorporating several desirable principles in
the holder in due course area, falls short of affording the consumer
full protection. The holder in due course doctrine continues with re-
94 The Official Text of U.C.C.C. provides for a three-month period but Oklahoma
has changed this to thirty days. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 14A, § 2-404(1) (Supp. 1969).
95 	§ 2-404, Alternative B, comment.
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spect to "good faith" assignees of instruments illegally obtained from
consumers, and in jurisdictions adopting Alternative B of section 2-404,
the consumer may still, in some instances, forfeit his defenses under a
waiver of defenses against assignees. However, since the Code has
substantially limited the effectiveness of the "standard techniques"
for precluding the buyer's defenses against assignees, financers and
sellers still desiring to accomplish this result must cast about for some
alternative method.
It has been suggested that the Code, and indeed the statutory
schemes of many states, afford such an alternative method by retaining
the distinction between a "consumer loan" and a "consumer credit
sale."" Since the "Credit Sales" Article of the U.C.C.C. regulates
situations in which the seller initially extends the credit," sellers might
adopt the procedure of presenting any buyer who desires credit with
a loan application from a cooperating finance company. In addition to
signing a retail sales contract, the consumer would sign the loan
application and perhaps an authorization for the finance company to
pay the money directly to the seller, Essentially the result would be
the same as under the present forms of financing. The seller would
receive his money immediately and, notwithstanding any subsequent
difficulties the buyer might have with the seller, the finance company
would insist upon full repayment of the loan. Should the consumer
become dissatisfied with his purchase and cease making payments, the
finance company would quickly point out that it is not responsible for
the fact that the consumer obtained a bad bargain with the money he
borrowed. Any note involved in the transaction would apply to the
loan and would not be a consumer note executed in connection with the
purchase. In order to find for the consumer, the courts would again
have to find sufficient connections between the finance company and
the seller to justify treating the finance company as a "co-participant"
in the sale. To avoid such retrogression, it has been suggested that
U.C.C.C. Section 2-404, Alternative A, also be made applicable to "a
lender subject to this Act who loans money to the debtor knowing it
will be used as the purchase price of specific consumer goods."" As
yet, however, there has been no such amendment and it remains to be
seen whether sellers and financers will shift to the "direct loan" ap-
proach in consumer transactions.
IV. CONCLUSION
In the final analysis the decisions and statutes surveyed in this
comment, including the U.C.C.C., do not afford the consumer compre-
hensive protection in holder in due course situations. In states which
99 See generally Littlefield, Parties and Transactions Covered by Consumer-Credit
Legislation, 8 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 463, 466-69 (1967). Compare U.C.C.C. § 2-104
(definition of a "Consumer Credit Sale") with U.C.C.C. § 3-104 (definition of a "Con-
sumer Loan").
97 See U.C.C.C. § 2-104(1)(a).
98 Littlefield, supra note 96, at 468-69.
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do not prohibit waiver of defense clauses, the statutes prohibiting
negotiable notes or preserving consumer defenses against holders of
such notes are susceptible to circumvention by the use of waiver of de-
fense clauses to endow sales contracts with the essential attributes of
negotiable notes. The statutes making waivers of defenses enforceable
if the buyer fails to notify the assignee of his defenses when requested
to do so are of little benefit to disadvantaged consumers who most
need protection. Moreover, the statutes in most instances allow a "good
faith" assignee to enforce a negotiable note or instrument taken
illegally by the seller. Since it is reasonable to assume that few rep-
utable sellers will be taking illegal instruments, this exception serves
to divest the consumer of protection where, theoretically, his need for
such protection is greatest. A number of cases have suggested that the
risk of the seller's dishonesty should be placed upon the financers, who
are more able to bear the risk of loss, who are in a better position to
investigate the reputation of the assignor, and who ultimately stand
to gain profits from the transaction." In order to accomplish this
result, the statutes seeking to prevent interposition of holder in due
course against consumers should, at the minimum, include:
1) An unqualified provision to the effect that all sub-
sequent holders of consumer instruments take subject to the
consumer's defenses;
2) An unqualified prohibition against waivers of de-
fenses against assignees; and
3) A provision that any lender who loans money know-
ing that it will be used as the purchase price of specific con-
sumer goods is subject to all claims or defenses which the
debtor has against the seller.
The scope of these provisions should be as broad as possible, covering
secured and unsecured transactions, and sales of services as well as
goods. A civil sanction could be included giving "good faith" assignees
a right of action for treble damages against any seller who transfers
an illegally obtained consumer note on which the assignee incurs a
loss as a result of the buyer's defenses.
The objection might be raised that such provisions would
"cripple" the consumer financing industry. This objection has already
been shown to be spurious,"° and constitutes nothing more than a
complaint that financers would then be required to ascertain the
honesty and reliability of their assignors before accepting their paper.
This complaint was ably countered by Justice Drew, speaking for the
court in Mutual Finance, more than a decade ago:
It may be that our holding here will require some changes
in business methods and will impose a greater burden on the
" Unico v. Owen, 50 N.J. 101, 110, 232 A.2d 405, 410 (1967); Mutual Fin. Co.
v. Martin, 63 So. 2d 649, 653 (Fla. 1953).
100 Note, Translating Sympathy for Deceived Consumers into Effective Programs for
Protection, 114 U. Pa. L. Rev. 395, 418 (1966).
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finance companies. We think the buyer—Mr. & Mrs. Gen-
eral Public—should have some protection somewhere along
the line. We believe the finance company is better able to
bear the risk of the dealer's insolvency than the buyer and
in a far better position to protect his interests against un-
scrupulous and insolvent dealers. . . .
If this opinion imposes great burdens on finance com-
panies it is a potent argument in favor of a rule which will
afford protection to the general buying public against un-
scrupulous dealers in personal property.'°'
F. ANTHONY MOONEY
101 63 So. 2d at 653.
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